Current avian influenza reports in Australia
Oceania is the only continent free from clade 2.3.4.4.b HPAI H5N1 (April 2024). Wild migratory birds will be returning to Australia between August – November, and therefore this constitutes the highest risk period for a viral incursion.
If you see any sick or dead wild birds, or poultry including backyard chooks, it is imperative that you call the Emergency Animal Disease Watch Hotline – regardless of which state you are located in. 1800 675 888. A summary of all cases is available on Outbreak Portal
We have performed a comprehensive risk assessment of HPAI incursion and evaluation of the current surveillance system, commissioned by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. An abridged version has been provided by Wildlife Health Australia.
The National Avian Influenza in Wild Birds Program continues to do surveillance across Australia for avian influenza. Enhanced surveillance by Michelle Wille and Marcel Klaassen in 2022, 2023 and 2024 demonstrated no evidence for HPAI H5N1 2.3.4.4b incursion into Australia.
Popular science article outlining the global situation and our response in Australia: Bird flu, human cases, and the risk to Australia and Chickens, ducks, seals and cows: a dangerous bird flu strain is knocking on Australia’s door
See more about our work on low pathogenic avian influenza, revealing the ecology of low pathogenic avian influenza (Strong host phylogenetic and ecological effects on host competency for avian influenza in Australian wild birds), and evolutionary genetics (Australia as a global sink for the genetic diversity of avian influenza A virus), and demonstrating how viruses enter and spread (Contrasting dynamics of two incursions of low pathogenicity avian influenza virus into Australia) in Australia
HPAI H7 outbreaks in 2024/2025
Updated: 12 March 2025
An outbreak of HPAI H7N8 was detected on a poultry farm near Euro on 10 Feb 2025. At present, four IP’s have been identified. All depopulation is complete, with almost 600,000 birds culled and ~7 million eggs destroyed. While this is the same subtype as was detected in NSW in 2024, it constitutes a novel spillover and evolution event, and is therefore not related to any of the outbreaks in Australia in 2024. Producers with 50 or more birds including poultry need to follow a housing requirement. Details available from AgVic.
Update: December 2024
New Zealand reported its first (EVER!) HPAI H7N6 outbreak in a free range egg farm near Otago Peninsula on 2 Dec 2024. Thus far, 2 sheds on the same property are affected. No spread to further properties. This virus is unrelated to the HPAI H7 outbreaks in Australia earlier in 2024, so likely constitutes a novel evolution event. The genome sequence is available on GISAID (4 December). More information from MPI NZ. This event has been resolved.
All Australian 2024 HPAI H7 outbreaks have been resolved. Details of the outbreak have been published in Outbreaks of high pathogenicity avian influenza in Australia
HPAI H7N3 reported in 7 poultry farms near Meredith. The IPs are located in the Restricted and Control Areas in the Golden Plains Shire where movement restrictions were already in place. A property near Terang is also positive for HPAI H7N9, and is linked to the first IP in Meredith. Both a housing order and movement restrictions were in place. Updates from Agriculture Victoria.
HPAI H7N8 reported in two poultry farms in the Greater Sydney Basin. Updates from NSW DPI. H7N8 also detected in a farm in the ACT, directly linked to an outbreak in NSW, followed by a backyard flock located in the quarantine area. Updates from ACT EPSDD.
These outbreaks are the result of a low pathogenic domestic strain from Australian wild birds entering poultry production, where high pathogenicity evolved. All previous HPAI outbreaks in Australia have been due to domestic HPAI H7 viruses, including the HPAI H7N7 outbreak in Victoria in 2020. In response, the USA and Japan imposed trade restrictions; in general trade restrictions are imposed in countries/regions with HPAI in poultry, or which use HPAI vaccines. To support the outbreak response, our teams are out catching ducks in Victoria, and will contribute samples and testing results previously collected to understand the viral burden and diversity of LPAI H7 in Victorian wild birds.
LPAI H9N2 reported in Western Australia. This outbreak is the result of a domestic strain from Australian wild birds entering poultry production. To manage the infection, the farmer culled the cohort thought to be infected and risk-based surveillance was conducted on the rest of the property for 4 weeks post the discovery of the infection, with no further virus was detected. To date, only H5 and H7 viruses have evolved to HPAI. LPAI H9N2 is found in Australia wild birds, and is endemic in Asian poultry.
A returned traveller tested positive for HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1a. Information is available in the Department of Health press release and a Promed post. Two previous human infections have been caused by this clade (previously in Nepal and India). Importantly, this is not the same clade of virus as is causing the global panzootic (clade 2.3.4.4b). Australia remains free from HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4.b.
What to do if you see sick or dead birds in Australia?
Video from the Northern Australia Biosecurity Strategy (NABS) [link]
What does a sick bird look like?
– Neurological signs such as loss of coordination and balance, trembling head and body, or twisting of the neck
– Lethargy and depression, unresponsiveness, lying down, drooping wings, dragging legs
– Closed and excessively watery eyes, possibly with opaque cornea or darkened iris (new sign associated with Gannets in current outbreak)
– Respiratory distress such as gaping (mouth breathing), nasal snicking (coughing sound), sneezing, gurgling, or rattling
Video of a dying Sandwich Tern, from Rijks et al. 2022. EID
Video of seabirds birds with HPAI at rehabilitation centres, from SANCOB
Official guidelines (Australia):
High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza clade 2.3.4.4b incursion risk assessment for Australia
Wildlife Health Australia: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) and Wild Animals in Australia: A RISK MITIGATION TOOLBOX FOR WILDLIFE MANAGERS (2024 update)
Wildlife Health Australia: Technical Issue Update – Global High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Events (updated Sept 2023)
Wildlife Health Australia: Risk management advice for bird banders, wildlife rangers and researchers (updated May 2024)
Wildlife Health Australia: Advice for veterinarians and animal health professionals (updated May 2024)
Wildlife Health Australia: Advice for people who encounter sick or dead wild birds (updated May 2024)
Wildlife Health Australia: Communicates guide for managers of wildlife populations (version Dec 2023)
World Organisation for Animal Health: Risk management for people working with wild birds
World Organisation for Animal Health: Practical guide for authorised field responders to HPAI outbreaks in marine mammals, with a focus on biosecurity, sample collection for virus detection and carcass disposal.
World Health Organisation: Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals: revised guidance
World Health Organisation: Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals
The Risk of Avian Influenza in the Southern Ocean: a practical guide
Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels – Guidelines for working with albatrosses and petrels during the high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 panzootic
Pacific Seabird Group: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) is a devastating wildlife disease that impacts seabird populations worldwide and warrants our attention and response
AUSVETPLAN response strategy avian influenza
AUSVETPLAN Guidance document: Risk based assessment of disease control options for rare and valuable animals
AUSVETPLAN Operational Procedures Manual Wild Animal Response Strategy
Australian Government, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry: Information on Avian Influenza (bird flu)
Australian Government, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry: Information for bird owners
Wildlife Health Australia: National Wildlife Biosecurity Guidelines
Farm Biosecurity: National Farm Biosecurity Manual for Poultry Production
Zoo and Aquarium Association Australia: Zoo and Aquarium Biosecurity
Australian Veterinary Association: Guidelines for veterinary personal biosecurity
Australian Department of Health and Aged Care information on Avian influenza in humans
Australian Department of Health and Aged Care: CDNA national guidelines for avian influenza – protecting people who work with birds and wildlife
Australian Centre for Disease Control: Bird flu toolkit for people who work with birds
Overview of Excersize Volare
If avian influenza emerges in Australia, outbreak details will be hosted on the Australian Government outbreaks portal (no information here currently)
More about what we are doing in Antarctica:
The first detection of HPAI in the region occurred on South Georgia (British Antarctic) in October 2023 and the first detection on the Antarctic Peninsula occurred on March 2024. All data from the region are collated on our SCAR AWHN mortality database – we are grateful to all contributors. The SCAR Antarctic Wildlife Health Network Action Group has prepared a series of recommendations, undertaken comprehensive risk mapping, and produces update bulletins
Many groups have been sampling in the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic. List of publications (27/03/2025, in no particular order):
Unexpected Delayed Incursion of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 (Clade 2.3.4.4b) Into the Antarctic Region
A call to innovate Antarctic avian influenza surveillance
Emergence, spread, and impact of high pathogenicity avian influenza H5 in wild birds and mammals of South America and Antarctica, October 2022 to March 2024
Searching for high pathogenicity avian influenza virus in Antarctica
Mass mortality events in the sub-Antarctic Indian Ocean caused by long-distance circumpolar spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b
High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus (HPAIV) H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b recovered from a kelp gull (Larus dominicanus) in the South Shetland Islands, Antarctica
Confirmation of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 in skuas, Antarctica 2024
Lack of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 in the South Shetland Islands in Antarctica, Early 2023
Skuas mortalities linked to positives HPAIV A/H5 beyond Polar Antarctic Circle
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Suspected in penguins and shags on the Antarctic Peninsula and West Antarctic Coast
Reply to León et al. (2024): Interpretation and Use of In-Field Diagnostics for High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) in Antarctica– A Cautionary Tale
Detection and spread of high pathogenicity avian influenza virus H5N1 in the Antarctic Region
A case study of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 at Bird Island, South Georgia: the first documented outbreak in the subantarctic region
A number of genomes are now available for HPAI detected in the South Atlantic, sub-Antarctic, and Antarctica. Looks like multiple seperate introductions from South America, with the virus introduction to the South Shetlands and Torgersen Island, both on the Antarctic Peninsula, being different.
Data downloded from GISAID 21/01/2025, and relevant genome sequences are from
Detection and spread of high pathogenicity avian influenza virus H5N1 in the Antarctic Region , and
High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus (HPAIV) H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b recovered from a kelp gull (Larus dominicanus) in the South Shetland Islands, Antarctica
Phylogenetic analysis on the concatenated genomes from GISAID (3 Feb). Conclusions: There have been 2 seperate virus introductions into the Antarctic Peninsula. The Kelp Gull genome (in darker blue) clusters with sequences from South America, suggesting it was an indpenedant spillover. From South America, there was a jump to South Georgia (dark blue), and then two jumps into the Antarctic Peninsula from there (the light blue sequence from Torgersen and the black INACH sequences dont cluster teogether, which tells us this). The light green sequence is one from the Falklands, which is an independant jump from South America. To do: add the sequences from Crozet and Kerguelen.
Global situation:
FAO situation report (global)
WOAH Situation reports (global)
EFSA Avian influenza overview September – December 2024 (European)
European Union Reference Laboratories dashboard (European)
RSPB: Avian influenza: a major thread to our struggling seabirds (UK)
APHIS 2022-2023 Detections of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (USA)
Wildlife Health Information Sharing Partnership (USA)
Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative dashboard (Canada)
Chilean Scernapesca dashboard (Chile)
Chilean SAG dashboard (Chile)
Brazilian Dashboard (Brazil)
Peruvian dashboard (Peru)
H5Nx Nexstrain portal with all relevant sequence data
Response plans and recommendations:
FAO: Global strategy for the prevention and control of high pathogenicity avian influenza (2024–2033)
DEFRA: Mitigation strategy for avian influenza in wild birds in England and Wales.
Recommendations from the Invasive Species Council: High pathogenicity avian influenza in wildlife: Is Australia prepared?
Scientific Task Force on Avian Influenza and Wild Birds statement on: H5N1 High pathogenicity avian influenza in wild birds – Unprecedented conservation impacts and urgent needs
Mitigation strategy for avian influenza in wild birds in England and Wales
Scottish wild bird highly pathogenic avian influenza response plan
WOAH: Avian influenza: why strong public policies are vital
OFFLU: Southward expansion of high pathogenicity avian influenza H5 in wildlife in South America: estimated impact on wildlife populations, and risk of incursion into Antarctica
Summary of the FAO Global Consultations on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
RSPB. Avian Influenza: a major threat to our struggling seabirds
EFSA: Guidance for reporting 2023 laboratory data on avian influenza
HAIRS risk statement: Avian influenza A(H5N1) in livestock
OFFLU Statement on the Development of a Global Consensus H5 Influenza Genotyping Framework
Human health risk:
A quadripartite risk assessment (12 December 2024) (previous assessment 14 Aug 2024) determined that the risk of infection with HPAI for the general population was low, and for occupationally exposed people (e.g. poultry or dairy workers) the risk was low to medium (but with high uncertainty). Prior to 2023, all human infections with HPAI have been in people interacting with birds, particularly poultry (chickens, turkeys and ducks), however in 2024, one human case was associated with dairy production. Human infections have occurred in Asia, Europe, Africa, North and South America. Reassuringly, no onward transmission between humans has been detected. Details on human cases are listed below (last updated ~ July 2023). Please verify information below with the latest information from WHO.
CDC: Global reported A(H5N1) human cases, January 2022 through April 25, 2024
Cases of gs/gd H5Nx in humans since 2020 (updated 20 January 2025)
– >94 human cases of 2.3.4.4. H5N6 in China 2014-2024. Most cases have confirmed link to poultry [aggregation]
– 7 poultry workers containing an outbreak of 2.3.4.4. H5N8 in poultry in Russia, 2020 [WHO notification, scientific article]
– 1 human case of 2.3.4.4.h H5N6 in Laos in 2021 [scientific article]
– 3 poultry workers infected with H5Nx in Nigeria in 2021. Likely to comprise environmental carriage rather than bona fide infection [news story]
– 1 human case of 2.3.2.1a H5N1 in India in 2022 [scientific article]
– 1 human case of 2.3.4.4b H5N1 in Viet Nam in 2022 [Vietnamese ministry of health, english language news story]
– 1 human case of 2.3.4.4b H5N1 in UK in 2022. Kept flock of ducks in the home. Likely to comprise environmental carriage rather than bona fide infection [scientific article]
– 2 poultry workers infected of 2.3.4.4b H5N1 in Spain in 2022. Likely to comprise environmental carriage rather than bona fide infection [scientific article]
– 1 poultry worker infected with 2.3.4.4b H5N1 in USA in 2022. Likely to comprise environmental carriage rather than bona fide infection [WHO notification]
– 2 human cases of H5N1 in China in 2022-23 [news story]
– 2 human cases of 2.3.2.1c H5N1 in Cambodia in 2023 [WHO notification]
– 2 poultry workers infected of 2.3.4.4b H5N1 in UK in 2023. One case likely comprises environmental carriage rather than bona fide infection [news story]
– 1 human case of 2.3.4.4b H5N1 in Ecuador in 2023 [WHO notification]
– 1 human case of 2.3.4.4b H5N1 in Chile in 2023 [WHO notification]
– 2 human cases of 2.3.4.4b H5N1 in the UK in 2023 [WHO information]
– 8 human cases of 2.3.2.1c H5N1 in Cambodia in 2024 [CDC information]
– 1 human case of 2.3.4.4b (unconfirmed) H5N1 in Vietnam in 2024 [CIDRAP information]
– 1 human case of 2.3.2.1a H5N1 in Australia in a return traveller from India in 2024 [Dept Health notification]
– 1 human case of LPAI H5N2 in Mexico in 2024 [WHO notification][preprint]
– 1 human case of 2.3.4.4b H5N1 in Canada in 2024 [CBC] [scientific article]
– 2 human cases of 2.3.2.1c H5N1 in Cambodia in 2025 [CIDRAP information][CIDRAP article]
-1 human case of 2.3.4.4.b H5N1 in the UK in 2025 [UK government]
– 70 human cases of 2.3.4.4b H5N1 in the USA in dairy and poultry workers since 2024 [CDC website, updated 27 Feb]
– 1 human case of 2.3.4.4b H5N1 in Mexico in 2025 [CIDRAP article]
-1 human case of ? H5N1 in India in 2025 [news article]
Intersting paper outlining the challenges of interpreting qPCR detections in humans – infection or environmental contamination? https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1201971223007063
In addition to human cases with H5Nx, there have been human cases with H3, H7, H9, H10.
HPAI in Dairy Cattle:
Information updated here 14 April 2025
Link to summaries of scientific papers
1007 farms, 17 states. Current detections in California,Idaho, Nevada. Latest update: 25 March.
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/livestock-poultry-disease/avian/avian-influenza/hpai-detections/livestock
> This dashboard contains not only information on detections, but is loaded with lots of resources and recommendations.
Human cases due to HPAI in cattle can be found here: CDC human infection dashboard
Genomic Data are available in the North America H5Nx public NextStrain build: https://nextstrain.org/groups/moncla-lab/h5nx/north-america/ha?c=species_group
https://nextstrain.org/avian-flu/h5n1-cattle-outbreak/genome?c=division&m=div
Sequence data from HPAI H5N1 outbreak in cattle more easily available on GenBank.
https://ncbiinsights.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/2024/05/23/avian-influenza-a-h5n1-virus-sequences/
Resources
Download a copy of my Endnote Library (updated 6/01/2025) HPAI_Jan2025.enlp
FAO: Recommendations for the surveillance of influenza A(H5N1) in cattle
https://openknowledge.fao.org/items/4c29fcb1-67e2-4a37-a780-cb4fe0c9f253
Joint FAO/WHO/WOAH preliminary assessment of recent influenza A(H5N1) viruses
https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/influenza/human-animal-interface-risk-assessments/updated-joint-fao-who-woah-public-health-assessment-of-recent-influenza-a(h5)-virus-events-in-animals-and-people.pdf?sfvrsn=273b9244_1&download=truem
Joint WHO/FAO/WOAH risk assessment. Risk to humans still considered low,
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus in Animals: Interim Recommendations for Prevention, Monitoring, and Public Health Investigations
https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/prevention/hpai-interim-recommendations.html
Technical Report: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Viruses
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/spotlights/2023-2024/h5n1-technical-report-06052024.htm
Rapid Qualitative Risk Assessment: The Risk to Dairy Cattle in Canada from Avian Influenza A(H5N1) in Dairy Cattle in the US 2024 08 14
https://cezd.ca/reports/rapidqualitativeriskassessmenttherisktodairycattleincanadafromavianinfluenzaAH5N1indairycattleintheus20240814?l=en-us
USDA’s control strategy:
https://www.agriculture.com/usda-aims-to-isolate-exhaust-h5n1-virus-in-dairy-herds-8657880
WOAH GF-TAD Americas teleconference
GF-TADs Meeting: Detection of HPAI in Ruminants and Humans in the USA – Americas (woah.org)
DEFRA (UK) have done an outbreak assessment for HPAI of avian origin in domestic livestock
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/influenza-a-h5n1-of-avian-origin-in-domestic-livestock-in-the-usa
A good review of the stuation in the US, and implications for Great Britiain.
“The most likely routes of entry of this American H5N1 virus into Great Britain are via trade in bovine products from affected farms in the USA, or by migratory wild birds. There is no trade in live cattle.”
“Therefore, there could be a route of entry to Great Britain of virus through unpasteurised dairy products imported from affected farms in the USA, although the vast majority of dairy products from the USA are pasteurised, such as cheese and whey, along with smaller amounts of yogurt, condensed milk and dairy spreads”
USDA Actions to Protect Livestock Health From Highly Pathogenic H5N1 Avian Influenza
https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2024/04/24/usda-actions-protect-livestock-health-highly-pathogenic-h5n1-avian
FDA Updates on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)
https://www.fda.gov/food/alerts-advisories-safety-information/updates-highly-pathogenic-avian-influenza-hpai
APHIS has put in further guidelines around cattle movement to increase traceability
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/news/agency-announcements/aphis-bolsters-animal-disease-traceability-united-states
Avian Influenza A(H5N1) U.S. Situation Update and CDC Activities
Current Situation Highlights Importance of Preventive Measures for People with Exposures
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/spotlights/2023-2024/one-health-situation-update.htm
includes:
– Recommendations for Worker Protection and Use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to Reduce Exposure to Novel Influenza A Viruses Associated with Severe Disease in Humans
– Results of antiviral susceptibility tests showing that H5N1 is susceptible to neuraminidase inhibitors.
USDA Confirms Cow-to-Cow Transmission a Factor in Avian Flu Spread
https://www.agweb.com/news/livestock/dairy/new-usda-confirms-cow-cow-transmission-factor-avian-flu-spread
Avian influenza A(H5N1) in dairy farms: An update on public health and food safety concerns
https://ncceh.ca/resources/blog/avian-influenza-ah5n1-dairy-farms-update-public-health-and-food-safety-concerns
Updates on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)
https://www.fda.gov/food/alerts-advisories-safety-information/updates-highly-pathogenic-avian-influenza-hpai
APHIS Recommendations for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 Virus in Livestock For State Animal Health Officials, Accredited Veterinarians and Producers: https://www.aphis.usda.gov/sites/default/files/recommendations-hpai-livestock.pdf
“Producers should practice enhanced biosecurity, minimize animal movements, test animals before movement, and isolate animals moved on or off premises”
Detection of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H5N1) in Dairy Herds: Frequently Asked Questions
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/sites/default/files/hpai-dairy-faqs.pdf
WOAH Statement
https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-in-cattle/
USDA’s Testing recommendations for cattle
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/spotlights/2023-2024/h5n1-analysis-texas.htm
WHO webinar on public health risk of avian influenza in dairy cattle with lots of good stuff in there (06/05/2024)
2024_05_06_H5N1_epiwin.pptx
Research articles, since ~ Nov 2022 (ongoing):
Follow me on Twitter/X for real-time publication sharing @DuckSwabber
Download a copy of my Endnote Library (updated 31/01/2025) HPAI_30Jan2025.enlp
Link to publications and summaries
